

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**CONTROLLING CONFLICT IN AFRICA**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL RENWICK L. PAYNE  
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

**Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited**

**USAWC CLASS OF 2002  
Senior Service College Fellow**



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**

**20020806 333**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**CONTROLLING CONFLICT IN AFRICA**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Renwick L. Payne  
United States Army

Colonel Thomas Dempsey  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Renwick I. Payne  
TITLE: Controlling Conflict in Africa  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 09 April 2002 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The profound challenge facing U.S. policy makers in ensuring stability, enhancing security, and controlling conflict in Africa, is that it requires more than just revamped military to military programs, increased assistance and diplomatic presence, expanded trade and democracy and HIV/AIDS initiatives. The U.S. strategy will require a creative, balanced, proactive engagement that addresses the roots of conflicts. The current National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) both stress engagement as a major aspect of achieving their goals. Former president Clinton, as a compromise between sending troops to war-torn Africa and doing nothing, launched a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing security and promoting prosperity in the region. The Bush administration has adapted many of these programs to pursue its goals in the region. This research paper will identify how U.S engagement can address the roots of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
PREFACE.....	vii
CONTROLLING CONFLICT IN AFRICA.....	1
THE CHALLENGES.....	2
AFRICA AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION.....	5
STRATEGIC PROGRAMS.....	7
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?.....	11
A POLICY IN TRANSITION .....	13
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	17
CONCLUSION.....	19
ENDNOTES .....	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	25



## PREFACE

This paper is the result of the author's Army War College Fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International (CSIS).

I would like to thank the staffs of the International security Program and the African Program for their assistance and ideas throughout the Fellowship. This report would not have been possible without the experience and guidance of Ms Jennifer Cooke as an academic mentor.

I also offer my appreciation to COL. Smith, Ms Elaine Palmer and the staff of the USAWC Senior Service College Fellowship Program Office for their support. To COL. Thomas Dempsey, thanks for your knowledge and encouragement that allowed me complete this paper.



## CONTROLLING CONFLICT IN AFRICA

The profound challenge facing U.S. policy makers in ensuring stability, enhancing security, and controlling conflict in Africa, is that it requires more than just revamped military to military programs, increased assistance and diplomatic presence, expanded trade and democracy and HIV/AIDS initiatives. The U.S. strategy will require a creative, balanced, proactive engagement that addresses the roots of conflicts. The current National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) both stress engagement as a major aspect of achieving their goals. Former president Clinton, as a compromise between sending troops to war-torn Africa and doing nothing, launched a number of initiatives aimed at enhancing security and promoting prosperity in the region. The Bush administration has adapted many of these programs to pursue its goals in the region. This research paper will identify how U.S. engagement can address the roots of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Forty-three countries that few Americans know, in a place that most still think of as one large country, racked by abject poverty, disease and constant war, have required the United States to spend billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and deploy its military to over 25 contingency operations in the past decade. Sub-Saharan Africa, with 700 million people and 20 percent of the world's landmass, was home to 11 of the 25 major armed conflicts in 2000.<sup>1</sup> The region contains 24 of the 25 most AIDS-afflicted countries and is home to 26 million adults and children living with the disease<sup>2</sup>. Chronic poverty, slow economic growth, insurmountable debt, (33 of the world's poorest debtor countries are African), and over 200 million people living on less than a dollar a day, these are all pictures of Africa.<sup>3</sup>

In the period since the end of the Cold War, the former colonial powers and cold warriors have neglected the continent. With continued conflict and diminished interest from the world's lone super power, African leaders have attempted to come up with African solutions. In many cases regional organizations, originally created to promote economic integration, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have assumed some security functions as well. To date none of these regional groupings has been overly successful in stemming conflict.

Is there a U.S. strategic interest in the region, and if there is, how should the United States attempt to control and end conflict in Africa? Clearly to a trading nation like the United States, a potential market of 700 million consumers is significant. Currently 15 percent of the U.S. imported oil supply comes from sub-Saharan Africa<sup>4</sup>. And while U.S. exports to the region

account for less than 1 percent of the U.S. total, they do exceed those to the former Soviet Union and could grow substantially. In the first six months of 2001 the total U.S. trade with the region increased by 17 percent when compared with the same period for 2000. U.S. imports from the region exceed \$12 billion.<sup>5</sup> As the region stabilizes, oil and other exports can be expected to rise. Beyond trade there are important security issues at stake as well. Failed or conflicted states provide safe haven for international crime, terrorism, narcotics trafficking and weapons proliferation, all issues of grave concern to the United States and the international community. There is also bipartisan congressional interest in the fight against HIV/AIDS and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) impact on the humanitarian crises caused in part by continuing conflict in the region. The United States is in a unique position, as the world's sole super power, to take the lead or provide prominent support to its allies and friends in Europe and Africa if it is to promote trade, deter, control and curtail conflict in the region, and bring about the peace and stability that is necessary for development. This assurance of sustain engagement will help reflect Africa's increasing importance to the United States strategic interest.

Africa's conflicts are complex. They are rooted in poverty, scarcity, exclusion, and ethnic divides fomented by colonial leaders and manipulated by post-colonial leaders bent on maintaining power. Although these situations pose a serious challenge to U.S. interest in the region, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 clearly demonstrated that a strategy couldn't neglect parts of the world and not anticipate negative consequences.

## THE CHALLENGES

In the post Cold-War period, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen continual conflict. In the twelve years from 1990, there have never been fewer than three major armed conflicts during any twelve-month period. A major armed conflict is generally defined as "the use of armed force between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year in which the incompatibility concerns control of government and/or territory"<sup>6</sup>. There have consistently been more wars on the African continent in the period 1990-2000 than elsewhere in the world. The low point was 1996 with only three major conflicts. The continent opened the decade with eleven and closed with nine in 2000. By comparison there were a total of twenty-five major armed conflicts worldwide in 2000.

The challenge that faces the United States and its allies is the rise in Intensity of the remaining conflicts. The cost in national wealth and human life in most cases are staggering.

Though the conflicts are intra-state, transnational issues complicate most. These may include, but are not limited to, cross-border refugee flows, movement across international borders by both government and rebel forces and illegal trade in weapons and the warring country's natural resources. The conflicts in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan are examples. For the U.S and its allies this transnational characteristic requires a regional solution adding to the difficulty of controlling, resolving and deterring such conflicts. They help to prolong the events and always threaten the security of neighboring countries.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo: This is currently Africa's most complex conflict. The assassination of President Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and the succession of his son Joseph brought about a reduction in the intensity of the fighting. However, the failure to implement the December 2000 Harare disengagement and redeployment plan has left the country with multiple armies (approx 100K troops) from various internal factions and neighboring countries (Zimbabwe, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia), within its borders. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was authorized after the Lusaka agreement of 1999, with strength of 5,537 military personnel, including 500 military observers. By August 2001 there were only 2,000 deployed in country<sup>7</sup>. In March 2002 South Africa hosted the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), in Sun City, aimed at ending the stalemate between the warring factions. The new ceasefire agreement creates a transitional government with Joseph Kabila as the president and Jean-Pierre Bemba (leader of the Congolese Liberation Movement) as the new prime minister. The U.S. can support the new agreement by providing initial assistance through its Countries in Transition program and guiding the government through the qualification requirement for participation in the U.S./ Africa trade initiatives.

Burundi: The government forces continue to struggle against many splintered opposition groups. Former South African President Nelson Mandela mediated ministerial level peace talks in Arusha, sponsored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and attended by the heads of government from Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and the foreign minister from Tanzania. It is significant that the rebels were not represented. The historical animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi drives the conflict in Burundi. The government forces number forty thousand. The two major rebel armies are twelve to eighteen thousand strong. Reflecting the transnational nature of wars in this region, the Burundian military and Hutu rebel groups fight on opposite sides in the conflict in the DRC.<sup>8</sup> Against seemingly insurmountable odds the Arusha initiative has succeeded in developing a transitional government. However, it has not created a total ceasefire.

Sierra Leone: remains a problem, although there is an agreement signed by the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel movement. Signed in November 2000 in Lome it has slowed the fighting. Sierra Leone also has transnational issues. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is monitoring the cease-fire. However its troop strength has not reached the mandated requirement of 17,5000. By August 2001 there were only 12,500, as many nations were reluctant to provide troops. UNAMSIL replaced the forces from the multi state Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The United Kingdom has approximately 800 troops deployed mainly in the capital Freetown, providing training and support to the Sierra Leone army. Other complicating issues are Liberia's and Burkina Faso's support of the RUF and the UN and Guinean government accusation of RUF and Liberian support to Guinean insurgent attacks on villages inside Guinea. In response ECOWAS deployed military observers along the Guinea Liberia border<sup>9</sup>. Based on a May 2001 agreement between the government and the RUF there has been some rebel disarmament and a prisoner exchange. The RUF continue to control 7 of the 10 districts and are looking for legal recognition as a political party in hopes of turning their position into a political victory when elections are held.

This conflict has benefited from the most extensive U.S. efforts at controlling conflict in the region. African forces trained by both U.S. military initiatives, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and Operation Focus Relief, have seen peace keeping duty in Sierra Leone.

Sudan: Despite a government cease-fire proposal in April 2001, the fighting in the Sudan continues. The government proposed a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM/A), operating in the southern areas, and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). As proposed, Egypt and Libya would monitor the agreement. Both the government and rebel forces have been unable to make the significant military gains, and territorial control has generally remained constant. In September 2001 the U.S. appointed a special envoy to find areas of agreement between the opposing forces, which can eventually build a bridge to peace.

Angola provides the U.S. policy makers another unique challenge. It is the one of the few situations where one side can claim a military victory over its opponent. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) has been successful in ending the continents longest war. Although during 1999-2000 an estimated 11000 rebels from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had laid down their arms and the FAA had interdicted the rebel supply lines from Namibia and Zambia, The government was unable to close the conflict. The government reported the death in late February 2002 of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's longtime leader<sup>10</sup> and on

April 4<sup>th</sup> signed a cease-fire agreement. This is the fourth peace deal signed by the warring factions since Angola achieved independence from Portugal in 1975. The cease-fire includes demobilization of 50,000 UNITA fighters and their families and will be monitored by the United Nations.

African conflicts share several similarities. Significantly high civilian causalities can be attributed to the indiscipline of the armies and rebel group and the guerrilla nature of these conflicts where civilians are indistinguishable from fighters. Human costs continue to be astronomical. With millions of refugees and internally displaced peoples, governments have been hard pressed to provide any social services to their rural population. Another striking feature is there may be no military solutions to these conflicts. In each, neither the government and its supporters nor the rebel factions has the military capability to prevail. Therefore the conflagration of prolonged conflicts, internally displaced persons, refugees and humanitarian crises create complex emergencies that require resources well beyond the capacity available in the region. United States and international programs, aimed at building the capability of the regional and sub-regional organizations to monitor, curtail and control conflict as well as provide disciplined peacekeeping, allows bilateral, multilateral development aid initiatives, and resources provided by non-governmental organization to attack root causes such as scarcity and poverty, breaking the conflict cycle. As these sub-regional capacities mature, African solutions to the continent's problems will emerge negating U.S. and international intervention.

#### AFRICA AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY IN THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

The Clinton administration's series of National Security Strategy documents, culminating with "A National Security Strategy for a Global Age" (December 2000), stressed enhancing security as a fundamental goal and a prerequisite for promoting prosperity, democracy, and human rights. The administration sought to achieve these goals through a policy of engagement, enabling the U.S. to shape the international environment, respond to threats and crises, and prepare for an uncertain future<sup>11</sup>.

However, the defining events of the Clinton administration's policy toward Africa were the Somalia peacekeeping debacle of 1993 and the Rwanda genocide the following year. Early in Clinton's tenure, the image of a U.S. ranger dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by cheering crowds left an indelible mark on the consciousness of the U.S. public and the administration. What had started as well-meaning humanitarian mission to a country that few Americans could point to on a map had ended in a horrifying and humiliating loss of American lives. The administration was not prepared to let this happen again.

Right on the heels of the Somalia disaster came the beginnings of the Rwanda genocide. The United States was reluctant to respond in any meaningful way. There was no possibility of U.S. direct involvement in Rwanda, and the administration resisted supporting UN involvement as well, believing, after what happened in Mogadishu, that direct multilateral interventions for humanitarian purposes, in places that don't matter strategically to the United States are a no-win situation that are not worth the risk.

After the horrors of Rwanda, this position too was untenable. The blow-back internationally from sitting idly by while 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in 100 days in 1994 impelled the Clinton administration to come up with a strategy and programs that were in some way responsive to African conflicts but which did not involve direct risk to U.S. soldiers.

The result of these events was unprecedented attention to conflict management in Africa by the Clinton administration. The president himself visited the continent twice where he spoke out on the Rwandan genocide and consulted with Nigeria on solutions for the fighting in Sierra Leone.<sup>12</sup> They then launched a wide range of initiatives, all of which stressed increased U.S. engagement with Africa, but none of which endangered U.S. interests or personnel. Many of these were not directly related to conflict management but created new Africa programs in a range of administrative agencies, e.g. a U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) office for Africa, the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) and other trade initiatives combined with special bilateral programs with Nigeria and South Africa<sup>13</sup>.

Paramount among the initiatives on the security front was support for regional initiatives—"African solutions to African problems." President Clinton personally supported efforts by former South African President Nelson Mandela to affect a lasting settlement in Burundi; the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative for Sudan; the United Nations (UN) and The Organization for African Unity (OAU) proposed a peace initiative for Ethiopia and Eritrea; the Africa-led Lusaka process for the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Economic Community of West African States-Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) managed Abuja process in Liberia and Lomé negotiations for Sierra Leone. The administration also developed strategic partnerships with Africa's "New Leaders"—Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda<sup>14</sup>. Few of the regional initiatives were successful, and by the end of Clinton's administration, all of the New Leaders were at war. Only in Ethiopia-Eritrea, where the U.S. combined sustained high-level leadership (Anthony Lake the national-security adviser devoted considerable attention to the effort) with an international and regional approach, were conflict resolution efforts successful<sup>15</sup>.

Ironically, during this period of high-level engagement the administration allowed mid and senior-level representation on the continent to decline. Early in the Clinton administration's tenure, the Africa Bureau lost a deputy assistant secretary position and 60 officer positions. The Africa Bureau and embassies in the region did not fill positions leaving large areas of the continent without on-site diplomatic personnel. These included Sudan, eastern Congo, northern Nigeria, Angola and Somalia, all areas with significant crisis. "The closure of more than a dozen United States Agency for International Development (USAID) missions in Africa and comparable cutbacks in intelligence resources further undermined U.S. capacities to manage conflict"<sup>16</sup>. This shortage of working diplomats necessitated the appointment of special envoys to mediate issues and manage crises. Africa's position was not helped by the expanding requirement for U.S. diplomats to the States of the former Soviet Union, an expansion that occurred concurrently with the administration's push for high-level engagement in Africa. The decline in representation was a byproduct of finite U.S. diplomatic resources and Africa's priority in the U.S. national strategy.

To control the multiple and expanding conflicts in the region, without committing U.S. troops, the administration proposed a number of military-to-military programs.

In 1996 the United States launched the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to train African militaries to conduct effective peacekeeping and humanitarian operations<sup>17</sup>. The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EPIC) program provided funding to upgrade peacekeeping and training centers, and "train the trainer" programs in countries around the world in order to make them more interoperable with the U.S. and other peacekeeping forces. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established to promote the exchange of ideas and information tailored specifically for African security concerns<sup>18</sup>. Only toward the end of Clinton's tenure did the Defense Department launch "Operation Focus Relief" putting U.S. soldiers on the ground, to train and equip seven West African battalions for peace enforcement missions in Sierra Leone.

## STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

The Clinton engagement initiatives were aimed at controlling conflict on the continent. Most of these were directed at regional militaries and were implemented by the Department of Defense and its Two U.S. Unified Commands sharing responsibility for the African continent. Central Command (CENTCOM) has responsibility for Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya. The remaining 42 countries fall within the European Command (EUCOM) area of

responsibility. They are responsible for conducting a mix of traditional military programs and new initiatives in three broad areas.

- Civilian control and defense reform.
- National and regional capacity building.
- Military professionalism.

Civilian and Defense Reform: The initiatives in this area are aimed at assisting African governments in enhancing the civilian control of their military and planning defense reform. These programs help governments better define the role of the military in their societies and to develop an appropriate civil-military relationship. The International Military Education Training (IMET) and the Expanded-IMET programs provide military education, while the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) provides instructions on civil-military relations, the role of the military in a democracy and defense economics. African governments and military also can assess programs at the Defense Resource Management Institute, the Naval Justice School, and the military service schools provide technical expertise on defense reorganization, international law and military justice.

National and Regional Capacity Building: The capacity building initiative is aimed at reducing the necessity for direct US military involvement in future contingency operations on the continent. The United States will help African nations develop the capacity needed to handle their own security problems. The key program of this initiative is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The ACRI is a State Department managed program executed by the Department of Defense. It was designed as a bilateral U.S.-African peacekeeping training intended to enhance the capacity of selected African militaries to respond effectively to peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations on the continent. The training emphasis is based on a common peacekeeping doctrine and the supply of interoperable communications equipment, which will enable the units to work together more effectively. The ACRI long-term goal is to build an African capacity of about 12,000 trained military personnel. Eight to ten commonly trained, commonly equipped and interoperable African battalions, with four to six specialized companies to provide Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS)<sup>19</sup>. In its fifth year, the ACRI has trained approximately 8,600 peacekeepers from five African militaries.<sup>20</sup>

The initial training is conducted by U.S. army instructors and includes comprehensive programs peacekeeping, humanitarian relief operations, military operational skills and command and staff operations. Observance of human rights, issues of humanitarian law, negotiations and mediation, and humanitarian concerns relevant to peacekeeping are interwoven into the training program. The follow-on training is incremental and begins six months after initial training and

continues for two and a half years. The international relief community is also integrated into the ACRI training. Organizations such as the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and AFRICARE prepare exercise scenarios and present summaries of their programs in the region. In addition ACRI communication equipment is compatible with that commonly used by relief organizations. The significant shortfall of the ACRI is its lack of integrated command and control and staff planning training. No country in the region, with the exception of Nigeria and South Africa, has the capability to deploy large formations with command and control and both are not participants in the program. Although a bilateral program the ACRI coordinates its activities with the humanitarian programs of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.

Complimentary to the ACRI is Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Initiative (EIPC), which focuses on institutional development on national peacekeeping training centers. EPIC works with the national peacekeeping centers, assisting the instructors and staff in developing their own peacekeeping training<sup>21</sup>.

Operation Focus Relief is the second major DoD capacity building initiative in the region. Focus Relief is USEUCOM's contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, first announced in 2000, it is intended to train and equip seven battalions from West African countries to perform peace enforcement operations. The training began in August 2000. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, NC deployed military trainers to Nigeria to work with a contingent of Nigerian forces. The second contingent included trainers from Fort Bragg and US Army Europe to work with units from Ghana and Senegal. In the third phase, September through December 2001, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Special Forces trained a second contingent of Nigerian troops. Focus Relief training included tactical maneuver, combat medical tasks and human rights. The units were provided with small arms, communications equipment and wheeled vehicles<sup>22</sup>.

Other initiatives include regional and strategic conferences that build trust and open lines of communication, providing equipment through the Foreign Military Sales, excess defense articles program, and providing programs that upgrade command and control structure.

Military Professionalism; Combined exercises and training programs between African partners and US military forces provide unique opportunities for preparing African militaries for multinational operations during crisis.

The Department uses the IMET and Expanded-IMET programs as low cost, apolitical programs that expose African students to US professional military organizations and procedures, and the manner in which they function under civilian control.

Humanitarian Assistance programs provide another means for the United States to help improve the professional competence of regional militaries while helping African communities. Working through the Unified Commands, DoD provides training for the militaries in support of civil society.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds can strategically compliment those efforts that reinforce the role of a military as a contributing element to a democratic society.

For these programs the numbers of soldiers trained or quantity of money expended doesn't always measure success. If the goal is to increase the pool of trained peacekeepers in the region, thereby reducing the probability of U.S. troop deployment, then the operational benefit of these types of programs are as a force multiplier, reducing the need for future investment in U.S. military personnel and equipment. Trained and disciplined Africans deployed to maintain security in the region negate the requirement for U.S. forces to perform contingency missions. The ACRI have not reached its 12,000 goal, but its training has already proven effective, Mali and Ghana sent forces to Sierra Leone as part of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, and Benin deployed a contingent to Guinea-Bissau. Senegal also deployed forces as part of a U.N. mission to the Central African Republic. But just as significant the program has produced 8,600 African soldiers of all ranks and many countries who have been exposed, over an extended period, to U.S. training and military professionalism. The Focus Relief trained battalions were deployed to Sierra Leone in support of the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Without a permanent U.S. military presence in the region, these programs provide a cost effective engagement strategy. They provide an additional benefit of increased interoperability between the U.S. and its friends and allies in the region, making them potential coalition partners. As the African partners become more effective at maintaining regional peace and stability, U.S. forces may be called upon less frequently to deploy to the region.

The most significant non-military governmental initiative for the region is H.R.434, the "Trade and Development Act of 2000". The section dealing with trade in sub-Saharan Africa is generally known as the "African Growth and Opportunity Act" (AGOA). AGOA was passed into law in May 2000 and signaled a change in the emphasis in US economic policy towards Africa.<sup>23</sup>

AGOA includes a series of complementary initiatives through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), the Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), geared towards expanding trade between the region and the United States. It also requires a program of assistance for

developing African infrastructure. The US department of Transportation has taken the lead in this area.

The Clinton administration aggressively advertised its policy aims to the American public and its initiatives to the congress, emphasizing the importance of engagement, conflict reduction and the reintegration of the region into the global market place with programs such as ACRI and AGOA at the governmental level, and the National Summit on Africa and the Initiatives of the Corporate Council on Africa at the private level. Other areas such as, state-sponsored terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and infectious disease especially HIV/AIDS would require a sustain effort at the regional and sub-regional level.

In spite of the Clinton administration's rhetoric, high-level personal involvement and the implementation of new initiatives, it is uncertain the U.S. gained much for the time and money invested in conflict resolution in the region. Sustained engagement has made some progress but there are areas of conflict yet to solve and at the end of the administration there were wars in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Somalia.

#### THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

Early indications from candidate Bush that Africa was not a strategic priority were not initially borne out. Within the first six months of his tenure, President Bush met with seven African heads of state including Nigerian President Olosugun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki. Secretary of State Colin Powell made an extensive visit to the continent and met with president Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Joseph Kibila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Washington. Colin Powell's early visit to the region was not a signal that the new administration would continue the Clinton high profile public diplomacy, but an early indication of the secretary's commitment to the region. Secretary Powell underlined his personal connection to Africa when he told This Week, a program on the ABC network, "I am an African. My roots are in Africa....and Africa is a huge continent in great need."<sup>24</sup>

This represented a shift in the execution of U.S. policy in the region. The new administration prefers to proceed more quietly than its predecessor, relying less on public diplomacy and grand initiatives, and focusing instead on discreet, measurable benchmarks and goals. According to a member of the policy team, the Bush administration will seek to "match rhetoric with the level of engagement, and be more honest with outlining how far it is prepared to go". In keeping with this approach, objectives will be precisely and correctly defined, and will be pursued with discretion.<sup>25</sup>

What is new on the security front in the Bush administration is a new recognition, particularly after Sept. 11, of the importance of the region in general and the Horn of Africa in particular to the success of its first phase of the global war on terrorism. Prior to Sept. 11, President Bush had stepped up engagement on the war in Sudan, where the U.S. had achieved significant gains in anti-terrorist cooperation (dialogue between US and Sudanese officials on terrorism had been going on for over a year, and progress, even before Sept. 11 was reportedly good). On Sept. 6, in a Rose Garden ceremony, President Bush named former Senator Danforth as special envoy to Sudan to test the possibilities for U.S. engagement in a longer-term peace process. This became even more important after Sept. 11, when Sudan was reportedly very forthright in assisting the United States with counter-terrorist intelligence and cooperation<sup>26</sup>.

What is also changing is the past perception of Africa as a region of limited security interest to the United States. That concept of limited interest meant limited attention given. The result of limited attention was crisis response and efforts that were always too little too late. In the previous decade over 25 U.S. contingency operations were conducted in Africa<sup>27</sup>. The Bush administration changing view on Africa policy is reflected in the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs FY 2003 performance plan.

In the FY 2003 Performance Plan for the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, assistant secretary Walter H. Kansteiner III outlines the US policy for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa and its opportunities- increasing its commercial and private sector viability-as well as its challenges-the HIV/AIDS epidemic and continued regional conflict-are important to America. U.S. policy towards Africa promotes prosperity by fostering development and liberalization of Africa's private sector, thus strengthening the economies of potential trading partners while building a platform for U.S. investment. The United States promotes democracy and human rights as a reflection of our values and as a foundation for promoting our broader interests. Conflict resolution and the pursuit of regional stability are central to the Bureau's overall policy goals and objectives, as are the fights against HIV/AIDS, terrorism, transnational crime and environmental degradation. A secure and permanent U.S. presence at 42 embassies and four constituent posts ensures that we can meet the needs of American citizens abroad, carry out essential public diplomacy, and implement our policy and programs throughout Africa. Principal U.S. national interest for Africa are Economic Prosperity, including Trade; Democracy and Human Rights; Global issues such as the Environment and Health; and Conflict Resolution.<sup>28</sup>

—Walter H. Kansteiner III

The Bush administration's regional policy priorities and strategic goals of expanding trade and investment; increasing democracy, good governance, and respect for the rule of law;

increasing African capacity at the national sub-regional, and regional level to prevent, mitigate, and resolve crises, conflict, and regional instability; decrease the spread of disease, illegal narcotics, international crime, terrorism, and environmental degradation, is not a major shift from the previous Clinton administration.

Placing expanding Trade and investment as the U.S. top priority in the region, changes the tools the administration will use to achieve its goals. Clinton's enhancing security placed emphasis on military programs such as the ACRI and Operation Focus Relief. Bush's trade and investment priority would emphasize initiatives like AGOA and other economic incentives to bolster reforms in the sub-regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS. Expanding assistance to the regional organizations is a key objective of AGOA, and supporting them contributes significantly to U.S. national interest, including democracy, humanitarian response, economic prosperity, and law enforcement<sup>29</sup>. AGOA and other economic based programs are positioned to alleviate some of the root causes of conflict in the region by stimulating growth and increasing trade. After review, most of the Clinton era programs have survived but some will be changed.

#### A POLICY IN TRANSITION

The U.S. Strategic policy has had some positive impact on the region. In the period since the end of the cold war there has been an increase in the number of democratic countries on the continent and trade is becoming the preeminent concern of the governments. Although the African strategic profile has not attained a similar level as other regions, its importance to the United States has constantly increased during the last decade. This greater importance was reflected in the two presidential visits and the high level attention it received during the Clinton administration<sup>30</sup>. Engagement has ensured deepening ties and expanding trade between the United States and the countries in Africa.

There have been some successes. The engagement policy contributed significantly to the relatively smooth transitions in Mozambique, South Africa and Nigeria to democratic governments. There are now democratic governments in the continents most important countries. South Africa with the strongest economy and Nigeria the most densely populated in the region, both anchor major sub-regional organizations (South Africa in SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS) that are key to U.S. regional capacity building and security initiatives. U.S. Success in the region requires coherent and reliable partners on the continent and South Africa and Nigeria can provide that partnership. Both are influential in the wider international dialogue between the U.S. and the developing world, whether on trade, control of weapons of mass

destruction, drugs and debt<sup>31</sup>, but of greater significance to the region, they possess the only militaries capable of deploying large formations with integrated command and control. Nigeria, as the key state in ECOWAS, has become the major participant in both regional peace keeping and peace enforcement operations. South Africa though not a participant in ACRI and Focus Relief, has taken the lead in ceasefire negotiations for Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

"The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act will be key to our efforts to strengthen and support the private sector in sub-Saharan Africa. We will help the 35 eligible countries take full advantage of AGOA."<sup>32</sup>

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has emerged as an important player in promoting regional stability and seeking to resolve crisis in several West African states, notably Sierra Leone and Guinea. As ECOWAS develops better crisis prevention capabilities, fewer demands will be placed on the international community for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.<sup>33</sup>

—Walter H. Kansteiner III

The frame work for our strategy, very simply: Working through sub-regional organizations, recognizing the important leadership roles of countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Senegal, Ghana and Botswana and a few other states, to satisfy the President's priorities to promote regional stability, to help improve the trade and investment environments and to combat HIV and AIDS.<sup>34</sup>

—Michael Westphal

The Bush administration moved quickly to promote its priority for sustained engagement. The President established the U.S. Sub-Saharan African Trade and Economic Forum as required, and at the first meeting of the AGOA forum he announced the creation of \$200 million OPIC support facility to give American firms access to loans, guarantees and political risk insurance for investment projects in sub-Saharan Africa. He also announced the launch Trade for African Development and Enterprise Program. With \$15 million in initial funding, the trade program will establish regional hubs for global competitiveness that will help African businesses take advantage of AGOA, to sell more products in the global market<sup>35</sup>.

On December 31 2001, President Bush approved the designation of 35 Sub-Saharan African countries as eligible for tariff preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Among the states approved were the 6 who participated in Operation Focus Relief and the ACRI. The list also included Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, all three with signed peace agreements twelve months earlier.<sup>36</sup>

On March 2002 President Bush announced an increase in U.S development assistance funds by \$5 billion over 3 years. The assistance is tied to 3 broad standards of good governance, which directly impact conflict and stability, ruling justly, investing in people and encouraging economic freedom. A large portion of these new funds is expected to go to Africa<sup>37</sup>.

There was also movement on the security front. The State Department has proposed increases for many of its programs. The Countries in Transition (CIT) program, which requested \$20million in 2002, has proposed expanding and has requested \$43.5 million for 2003. The CIT is a Bush administration program designed to serve U.S. conflict resolution interests by providing targeted responses to the needs of countries moving from violent conflict to democratic rule. The proposed expansion of the program is to include countries that are in the process of consolidating democratic and economic reform. In the region CIT directly affects the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement programs in Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes region. Proposed increases in FMF will benefit the region. Including \$2 million for a new military health affairs program that will compliment the DoD training efforts to address HIV/AIDS crisis facing the militaries in Africa; \$4.5 million for African regional stability; \$6 million to continue engagement with the Nigerian military on reform, modernization, and democratization; and \$6 million to continue engagement with the South African military, which includes defense reform and EEO activities. The administration has also proposed increases in IMET to support ECOWAS, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal.<sup>38</sup>

Consistent with its priorities ACRI will be modified. The new African peace-building capacity program is planned for fiscal year 2003. Working in close consultation with African partners, it will continue peace-building and disaster response capacity enhancement programs, incorporating lessons learned from Operation Focus Relief and the current ACRI. There is a request for \$15 million for ACRI in 2002 and \$20 million for the follow-on program (ACRI/TEAM, Training Enhancement for African Militaries)<sup>39</sup>. As the U.S. restructures the program, it is an appropriate time to review the recommendations submitted in "Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Past, Present and Future?", and those compiled by the United States Army War College (USAWC) in December 1997. Many are still valid after five years of program implementation. Four of the broad recommendations from the USWAC can be implemented. (1) Enlarge participation among African democracies. (2) Plan and conduct actual African combined exercises. (3) Expand the use of law-enforcement personnel and disaster response experts. (4) Consider involvement in ACRI by the Army's reserve components.<sup>40</sup> The increasing personnel tempo demands placed on active duty U.S. Special Forces, by the global war on terrorism, can be alleviated by the introduction of Army National Guard Special Forces soldiers

as trainers for ACRI. The addition of law-enforcement personnel (maybe recently retired officers) to the training team will bring a new dimension to the training and expose the trainees to a different aspect of U.S. uniformed professionalism. The combined multilateral exercises, particularly when Africans are involved in all phases of the planning and execution, further enhance the capabilities on the participants as well as strengthening the regional organizations.

Of the fifteen recommendations offered in ACRI Past Present and Future, three are particularly cogent. (1) ACRI management should remain at the Department of State.<sup>41</sup> The ACRI is a part of a larger U.S. effort to stabilize the region; the DoS must remain the coordinating agency for all U.S. nation-to-nation support, and as a demonstration of civilian control of the military. The bureau of African Affairs has an African focus and the regional expertise to guide the program through the many nuances associated with the different countries and communities on the continent.

(2) ACRI implementation strategy should shift from a focused bilateral approach to a true multinational focus<sup>42</sup>. The nations are organizing themselves into sub-regional communities. Therefore ACRI would have a greater impact and be more cost effective as a support program to those organizations. Support at the regional level provides more effectively integrate staff planning and command and control issues which cannot be achieved in bilateral training with the small militaries in the region.

(3) ACRI training should be coordinated and complemented schedule-wise and curriculum-wise with other U.S. military training activities<sup>43</sup>. Beyond schedule and curriculum coordination, ACRI should become the umbrella program guiding the training prepared for and offered to African militaries. Under an ACRI umbrella the U.S. could provide a more streamlined training package and enhance the integration of training in country with that provided to officer and senior civilians at U.S. institutions.

An ACRI with these enhancements can provide a proactive military element to a balanced U.S. engagement strategy. Designed to support sub-regional militaries in developing the capacity to plan and execute a broad range of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations it provides the regional organizations flexibility in deploying forces and containing areas of conflict before they require international involvement.

The events of September 11 2001 and the current global war on terrorism (GWOT) have placed added emphasis on the CINC's activities in the region. With a renewed interest in Somalia - US ships and aircraft have been carrying out regular reconnaissance patrols off Somalia. There are ongoing discussions for co-operative security arrangements with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti to guard against terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa. Further,

USCENTCOM conducted its major bilateral training exercises with the Kenyan army. Operation "Edged Mallet" involved 250 Kenyan soldiers and 1000 U.S. Marines in training and humanitarian projects.<sup>44</sup> USEUCOM's MEDFLAG 2002 training exercise is schedule for August 2002. Uganda will host this multilateral exercise that will have regional participants from Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa, as well as Morocco, United Kingdom, Germany and France<sup>45</sup>.

Beyond the increased training activity in the horn of Africa, the GWOT has brought more opportunities for engagement and discourse. Countries like Sudan have taken on a new importance as previously discussed. Somalia and its lack of a central government, is increasingly important to U.S. interest, creating an opening to work with partners in the region (Kenya , Ethiopia and Djibouti as members of IGAD) to reestablish a viable government. As Afghanistan demonstrated countries with weak or collapsed states can be vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups. Poverty, scarcity, exclusion, ethnic and religious divide, the root causes of conflict in the region are also major contributors to terrorism and are not exclusive to the horn of Africa. As a byproduct, the GWOT has refocused the administration on the very issues than can control conflict in the entire sub-Saharan region.

The changing U.S. policy has an excellent mix of initiatives that can offer positive results over time. The longer term programs (e.g. AGOA) are geared towards sustained engagement and fostering economic development thereby reducing the entrenched poverty that is at the root of conflict in the region. Its military-to-military and public diplomacy programs (ACRI), as they are further refined will stabilize and terminate conflict ensuring security. Mid term results from the education programs will provide a stable environment for civilian control of professional militaries. Constant review and management of these programs and continued engagement will demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region. U.S. assurance of support will allow the regional organizations to pursue "African Solutions", further reducing the requirement for international troop deployment to contingency operations on the continent.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Education remains key to establishing the balanced civil-military relationship that will ensure military adherence to the democratic ideals of service to the civil society. The IMET and Expanded-IMET programs currently available to African military officers and senior civilians must be extended to include instructions to Non-Commissioned –Officers (NCOs). Initially the training should be resident in the US for senior NCOs, who will supplement US and other International trainers in the region. This train the trainer concept must be supported by a

tailored exportable training package. Using the US and British Armies as models, NCOs play a major role in developing and maintaining a disciplined force. The US military should seek and maintain instructor positions at various African military academies and staff colleges. In coalition with European and African allies, the US should explore the benefits of establishing a joint regional security academy. This will provide professional military and law enforcement education to mid and upper grade officers and NCOs in the region. ACSS must be funded to provide more of its level of interface at the senior ministerial level.

The recommendations submitted in "African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Past, Present and Future?" and those complied by the Army War College in December 1997 are still valid after 5 years of program implementation. For ACRI to provide a trained capability above the company and battalion level the program must be expanded to a multilateral regional training program. As a regional program it will have peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement training. It must train more than the planned 12,000 personnel, and must provide command and control, and staff planning training. No country in the region, with the exception of Nigeria and South Africa, has the capability to deploy large unit formations with command and control, however this capacity can be maintained by the sub-regional organizations. South Africa is important, the Department of State must find a way to encourage South Africa participate in the program. Reserve Component programs, could provide support to ACRI as it matures. Programs such as the National Guard's international program that currently provides state-to-state partnership with countries from the former Soviet Union can be expanded to include countries in Africa.

Readiness is not solely a military requirement. The end of the cold war saw a reduction of US diplomatic support to the region. This must be reversed. The State Department must reestablish its capacity to engage broadly and routinely in the region's conflicted areas. Diplomacy by Special Envoy can be effective, but it is broad and vigilant engagement strategy that results in success. To strengthen regional and sub-regional capacity the United States should appoint special representatives to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and provide a developmental and management assistance team to the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

AGOA is showing some success "During the first half of 2001, the total trade with Sub-Saharan Africa rose nearly 17% compared with the previous year. U.S. imports from the region exceeded \$12 billion. To build on the bilateral trade, the US must encourage its key regional partners to stimulate and increase intra-regional trade. The US, working with European Allies

international and regional organizations must develop a program to reduce the regional "Brain Drain". Trained people are a public good, needed to provide the services necessary in maintaining national growth and stability.

## CONCLUSION

The challenge facing U.S. policy makers in ensuring stability, enhancing security, and controlling conflict in Africa, is that it requires more than just revamped military to military programs, increased assistance and diplomatic presence, expanded trade and democracy and HIV/AIDS initiatives. The U.S. strategy will require a creative, balanced, proactive engagement that addresses the roots of conflicts. Although no single country possesses the resources or capability to correct all the ills of the region, the programs and initiatives available to the Bush administration can have a positive influence and go a long way towards curtailing, controlling, and eventually resolving conflict in the region. The Global War on Terrorism has brought into sharp focus the effects that U.S. policy can have on regions of the world that have been previously neglected. The events of September 11 2001 demonstrated that prolong neglect can have devastating consequences for the United States.

U.S. policy initiatives have had success in the region. In the short term, military to military programs such as ACRI and Focus Relief have provided trained and equipped troops to perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement duties and enhanced the capabilities in West Africa. Public diplomacy, education programs, and initiatives like CIT will help provide a stable environment for civilian control of professional militaries. Over the longer-term economic initiatives like AGOA and significantly increased development assistance will help provide stable economic development, reducing the entrenched poverty that is a major root cause of conflict in the region. Support for regional organizations has had some impact on containing conflict by produced ceasefire agreements in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and high level diplomatic engagement, for example the initiative of the special envoy to Sudan is making progress. The challenge is to sustain a balanced and vigilant engagement that anticipates potential conflicts and ensures that no area is neglected.

WORD COUNT= 8,068



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, "Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2000"; available from <http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/MajorArmedConflicts.html>. Internet. Accessed 17 December 2001, 54.

<sup>2</sup> J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, eds., Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration. (Washington, DC:CSIS Press, 2001), 13.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 96

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 106

<sup>5</sup> The White House, "U.S., Africa Strengthen Counter-Terrorism and Economic Ties", 29 October 2001; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2001/10/20011029-2.html>, Internet Accessed 19 February 2002,

<sup>6</sup> Taylor B. Seybolt, "Major Armed Conflicts". Available from <http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/MajorArmedConflicts.html> Internet. Accessed 17 December 2001, 15

<sup>7</sup> Col Christopher Langton, ed, The Military Balance 2001-2002 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 246

<sup>8</sup> Seybolt, 23

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 31

<sup>10</sup> Jon Jeter, "Death of Angolan Rebel Confirmed," The Washington Post, 24 February 2002, p. A20

<sup>11</sup> William J. Clinton, A National Security for a Global Age (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Morrison, 40

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 73

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 41

<sup>15</sup> Langton, 247

<sup>16</sup> Morrison, 41

<sup>17</sup> LTC Karen U. Kwiatkowski, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Past, Present, and Future? (U.S. Army War College: Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership 2000), 1

<sup>18</sup> Morrison, 58

<sup>19</sup> Kwiatkowski, 5

<sup>20</sup> Michael Westphal, "DoD News Briefing: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs," briefing scripted commentary, The Pentagon, 2 April 2002.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest Joint Report to Congress: Operational Benefits of U.S. Forces", available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2001/2568.htm> , internet accessed 1April 2002.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. European Command, "Changes in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility", effective 1 October 2000; available from <http://www.eucom.mil> , Internet Accessed 13 March 2002

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, "About The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)", available from <http://www.agoa.gov/About-AGOA/about-agoa.html> , Internet Accessed 17 December 2001.

<sup>24</sup> J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer Cooke, "Powell's Early Surprises," The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., 9 March 2001, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>26</sup> John Prendergast, "Senator Danforth's Sudan Challenge: Building a Bridge to Peace," Africa Notes, no. 5 (January 2002): 1

<sup>27</sup> Westphal.

<sup>28</sup> Walter H. Kansteiner, Bureau of African Affairs FY 2003 Bureau Performance Plan (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of State, 2002)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., goal 1

<sup>30</sup> Morrison, 40

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 73

<sup>32</sup> Kanstiener, goal 1

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., goal 3

<sup>34</sup> Westphal.

<sup>35</sup> The White House.

<sup>36</sup> The White House, "Statement by the Deputy Press Secretary", 2 January 2002; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020102-4.html> , Internet Accessed 9 January 2002.

<sup>37</sup>The White House, "President proposes \$5 Billion Plan to Help Developing Nations", 14 March 2002; available <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/html>, Internet Accessed 31 March 2002

<sup>38</sup>U.S. Department of State, "Presentation to Appropriations Subcommittees", available from <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7808.htm> , internet accessed 2 April 2002

<sup>39</sup> Kanstiener, goal 3

<sup>40</sup> Kwiatkowski, 101

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 105

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 101

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 101

<sup>44</sup> "U.S. Military Planes Back Joint Exercise," The Nation (Nairobi) February 7, 2002; available from <http://allafrica.com/stories.html>; internet accessed 22 April 2002.

<sup>45</sup> "U.S. to Spend \$0.5m On Training," New Vision (Kampala) March 20, 2002; available from <http://allafrica.com/stories.html>; internet accessed 22 April 2002.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Achebe, Chinua, Things Fall Apart. New York: Anchor Books, 1994.
- Barkan, Joel D. and Jennifer G. Cooke, "U.S. Policy Towards Kenya in the Wake of September 11: Can New Antiterrorist Imperatives be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals?" Africa Notes, no 4 (December 2001): 1-6.
- Campbell, Kurt M., and Michele A. Flournoy, eds., To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2001.
- Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy for a Global age. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000.
- Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999.
- Clough, Michael, Free at Last?: U.S. Policy towards Africa and the End of the Cold War. New York N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992.
- Copson, Raymond W., Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, INC, 1994
- Docking, Tim, "Special Report: Peacekeeping in Africa," 13 February 2001. available from <http://www.usip.org>. Internet. Accessed 27 December 2001.
- Henk, Daniel W., and Martin Revayi Rupiya., Funding Defense: Challenges of buying Military Capabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Carlisle PA: The Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2001. ISBN 1-58487-069-9
- Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, N.Y.: Touchstone, 1997.
- Kwiatkowski, Karen U., African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Past, Present and Future?. Carlisle PA: Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership U.S. Army War College, 2000
- Langton, Christopher, ed, The Military Balance 2001-2002. London: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Menkhaus, Ken, "Somalia: Next Up in the War on Terrorism?" Africa Notes, no 6 (January 2002): 1-9.
- Metz, Steven., Refining American Strategy in Africa. Carlisle PA: The Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2000. ISBN 1-58487-014-1
- Morrison, Stephen J. and Jennifer G. Cooke, eds., Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration. with a foreword by Chester A. Crocker. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2001.

Prendergast, John, "Senator Danforth's Sudan Challenge: Building a Bridge to Peace" Africa Notes, no 5 (January 2002): 1-6

Rumsfeld, Donald H., Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001.

Schraeder, Peter J., United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism Crisis and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Shinn, David H, "Ethiopia: Coping with Islamic Fundamentalism before and after September 11" Africa Notes, no 7 (February 2002): 1-7.

Throup, David W. "Kenya: Revolution, Relapse or Reform?" Africa Notes, no.3 ( November 2001): 1-9.

Wass de Czege, Huba., and Antilio J. Echevarria II. Towards a Strategy of Positive Ends. Carlisle PA: The Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2001. ISBN 1-58487-070-2

White, Thomas E., and Eric K. Shinseki. A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2001. Posture Statement presented to the 1<sup>st</sup> Secession, 107th Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001.